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    <title>Pipelines on Hormuz.net</title>
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      <title>The Bypass Routes: Why Pipeline Alternatives to Hormuz Have Never Been Enough</title>
      <link>https://hormuz.net/the-bypass-routes-why-pipeline-alternatives-to-hormuz-have-never-been-enough/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 26 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <description>&lt;p&gt;Every serious analysis of Hormuz closure scenarios eventually arrives at the same question: how much oil can get out without using the strait? The answer, consistently, is not enough — and understanding why requires examining the bypass infrastructure that exists, the infrastructure that has been proposed, and the fundamental mismatch between pipeline capacity and the volumes the strait normally moves.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;The numbers establish the problem. On a normal day, somewhere between 17 and 21 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum products transit Hormuz. The combined nameplate capacity of all existing bypass pipelines is a fraction of that figure, and nameplate capacity is not operational capacity. The infrastructure must be maintained, staffed, protected, and in some cases reversed from its normal flow direction before it becomes useful in a closure scenario. The gap between what the strait moves and what the alternatives can handle does not close quickly.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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