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    <title>Foreign Policy on Hormuz.net</title>
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      <title>Tehran&#39;s Hormuz Offer Returns Trump to Square One</title>
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      <pubDate>Mon, 27 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <description>&lt;p&gt;Iran has reportedly floated a deal: reopen the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for postponing nuclear talks. The framing is generous to Tehran on its face. It treats two unrelated problems as commensurate, and it trades a closure Iran has no right to impose for a delay on the only question that actually matters. Accepting it would not advance American policy. It would erase it.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Hormuz is a tactical disruption. The strait carries roughly a fifth of global oil shipments and any closure produces a real price spike, but the disruption is also temporary. Tankers reroute. Insurance markets adjust. Naval coalitions form. Every closure threat in the past four decades has ended the same way: the price comes down, the ships move, and Iran absorbs the political cost of having weaponized international waters. UNCLOS does not recognize Iran&amp;rsquo;s authority to close the strait in the first place. Treating its reopening as a concession is to legitimize a blockade that has no legal foundation.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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