<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?>
<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
  <channel>
    <title>Europe on Hormuz.net</title>
    <link>https://hormuz.net/tags/europe/</link>
    <description>Recent content in Europe on Hormuz.net</description>
    <generator>Hugo</generator>
    <language>en-us</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 26 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <atom:link href="https://hormuz.net/tags/europe/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
    <item>
      <title>Europe&#39;s New Hormuz Problem: How the Russia Break Created Gulf Gas Dependence</title>
      <link>https://hormuz.net/europes-new-hormuz-problem-how-the-russia-break-created-gulf-gas-dependence/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 26 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://hormuz.net/europes-new-hormuz-problem-how-the-russia-break-created-gulf-gas-dependence/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Before February 2022, European energy security analysis treated the Persian Gulf as a significant but secondary concern. The primary vulnerabilities ran through Ukrainian pipeline corridors and Russian supply decisions. Hormuz was a risk to Asian energy markets, to oil prices globally, and to a residual flow of LNG from Qatar to a handful of European regasification terminals that had been built for flexibility rather than baseload supply. The invasion of Ukraine changed this with a speed that European energy planners had not fully modeled. By the end of 2022, Europe was competing in global LNG markets for volumes that included substantial Qatari supply, and its exposure to events in the Persian Gulf had become structurally different from anything its policy frameworks had anticipated.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
